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Appellant, Jamis M. Johnson ("Johnson"), appearing pro se, respectfully files his
Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Summary
Judgment below declaring that Johnson is barred from asserting that he has any partnership
interest with Appellee, Jayson Orvis ("Orvis") by application of the doctrine of judicial
estoppel should be vacated for the reasons that 1) tin1 doctrine of judicial estoppel was
misapplied by the District Court and Court of Appeals; ii) summary judgment is precluded
as a matter of law because a) there remain genuine issues of material fact, b) the facts were
not viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant; and c) the District Court and Court of
Appeals improperly weighed evidence and evaluated credibility.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The Appellant in this Court is Jamis M. Johnson. The Appellee is Jayson Orvis.
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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-3(a); and Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3.

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: The Court of Appeals did not correctly construe and apply the respective
procedural burdens borne by opposing parties on summary judgment.
This issue was preserved below. (Record p. 2262, Petition for Rehearing)
The standard for review of this issue is as being a matter of law to review de novo for
correctness.
Issue No. 2: The Court of Appeals did not correctly apply the summary judgment standard
in this case.
This issue was preserved below. (Record p. 2258, Petition for Rehearing)
The standard for review of this issue is as being a matter of law to review de novo for
correctness.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
Utah Code Anno. §48-1-5, in part: "Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired
with partnership funds is partnership property."
Utah R. Civ. Pro 56(a), (c),(d), (e):
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof,
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
-vii-

(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
UtahR.Evid. 613(b)
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to
interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision
does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
The primary litigation involves the ownership by Orvis and Johnson of a partnership
in a highly profitable business. Johnson learned Orvis was diverting partnership funds. When
Johnson demanded an accounting, Orvis then sued for a declaratory judgment declaring he
did not have a partnership with Johnson. Johnson counterclaimed for his partnership interest
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and for an accounting of the partnership. This matter is before the Supreme Court on review
by Writ of Certiorari of the Court of Appeals panel decision which upheld Third District
Court Judge, Timothy Hanson's grant of summary judgment to Orvis declaring that Johnson
is barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel from claiming to be partner with Orvis.
These rulings were based upon a portion of a statement made in a deposition taken by the
SB A in a separate unrelated federal case. Johnson is alleged to have said to the SBA that he
did not have any partnership interest with Orvis or in anything else. The District Court held
that Johnson was "judicially estopped" from asserting a partnership with Orvis because of
the SBA statement. Johnson appeals that summary judgment on the basis that the doctrine
of judicial estoppel is inapplicable; that the elements were not raised nor met by Orvis in his
Summary Judgment Motion; that summary judgment is precluded because of the existence
of genuine material issues of fact, the failure to view the facts in a light most favorable to
Appellant, and for improper weighing of credibility. The Court of Appeals determined that
a movant need not allege each essential element for application of the judicial estoppel
doctrine and falsely asserted that Johnson had not raised, in opposition to the summary
judgment all of the elements of judicial estoppel, particularly reliance by the party (Orvis)
asserting judicial estoppel and the element of acting in bad faith, and therefore had waived
these elements. These issues were undisputedly raised by Johnson. The panel then weighed
the parties' respective evidence and credibility, not to determine whether a dispute of
material fact existed, but instead which version was more likely given extrinsic factors as to
the remaining non-alleged and unwaived elements of judicial estoppel, viz. - the same party
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or privy; same subject matter in the prior and current proceeding; and whether the prior SB A
statement was actually inconsistent. The Court of Appeals determined that Orvis was entitled
to a summary judgment without his even having suggested the presence of each element of
the doctrine.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE:
8-28-2001: Plaintiff/Appellee Jayson Orvis filed a Complaint in Third District Court against
Defendant/Appellant Jamis Johnson.
11-05-2001: Appellant/Defendant Johnson counterclaimed and named also as Third Party
Defendants Victor Lawrence, Deon Steckling, and Sam Spendlove.
11-05-2001: DaNell Johnson, wife of Johnson, was brought in and joined as a Third Party
Plaintiff and counterclaimant against Orvis and the Third Party Defendants, Lawrence, et.
al.
8-30-02: Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove moved for summary judgment to obtain
dismissal from the case which was granted by the district court, and an order was executed.
4-18-2003. DaNell Johnson was dismissed from the case without prejudice because she was
not properly joined as a party.
4-02-2004: Orvis moved for Summary Judgment against Johnson.
10-20-2004: The district court granted Orvis' motion entering summary judgment by Minute
Entry, and executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Order prepared by
Orvis's counsel, on 11-23-2004.
12-21-2004: Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals of the Order
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granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2-18-2005: Johnson filed a Motion For Summary Disposition, to which Orvis responded
which was denied by the Court of Appeal pending full briefing and oral argument.
9-9-2006: A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the summary
judgment of the District Court.
10-25-2006- Johnson filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc to the Utah Court of Appeals.
11-28-2006: The Utah Court of Appeals denied Johnson's Petition for Rehearing.
11-30-2006: Johnson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court.
2-12-2007: The Utah Supreme Court granted Johnson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
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VI. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Brief Outline of Factual and Procedural History
1.

Orvis (Plaintiff below) and Johnson (and wife DaNell) have a partnership

extending back to 1994 and dividing profit share on a group of credit adjustment businesses
("Orvis-Johnson partnership").
2. The partnership is extensively documented and evidenced by written agreements,
a multi year course of performance dividing profit share, financial records, and numerous
witnesses. An extensive listing of the partnership documents between the Johnsons and
Orvis was set out in Johnson's Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary
Disposition (Summ. Disp. Mem.). (Addendum Ex. 1, Summ. Disp. Mem., Ex. 10, page 3
and exhibits attached thereto.)
3. The Orvis-Johnson partnership businesses grew to be extremely profitable now
involving millions of dollars, and with Orvis now taking an estimated monthly profit of
$800,000 personally or in excess of $10 Million annually. (Record p. 2243)
4. Johnson asserts that Orvis first began embezzling and misappropriating partnership
profit shares as early as 1997. (Record p. 2247). Discovery to date, particularly deposition
testimony of Orvis's employees, confirms this. See the deposition testimony of Will Vigil
(Record p. 2285-2288); See the deposition testimony of Tommy Triplett (Record p. 855875); and see the deposition testimony of Jade Griffen. (Record p. 877-884)
5. Johnson had an SB A judgment against him stemming from a personal guarantee
on a business that failed in the late 80s. ("SBA Judgment"). (Record p. 2247) Over several
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years, Johnson was deposed by the SBA in post judgment proceedings, as was Johnson's
wife, DaNell Johnson, who was not a judgment debtor of the SBA. (Record p. 2249)
6. Attorney Victor Lawrence represented DaNell Johnson before the SBA (Record
p. 2390) and in numerous other matters; Attorney Victor Lawrence represented Jamis
Johnson before the SBA and in numerous business matters. Attorney Victor Lawrence was
eventually placed as directing attorney for Lexington Law Firm (the marketing for which was
done by the Orvis-Johnson partnership); and Attorney Victor Lawrence represented the
Johnsons with regard to the Orvis-Johnson partnership. (Record p. 2246)
7. In July 2001, Johnson, suspecting his partner Orvis of fraud and possible
embezzlement, made written demand on Orvis for an accounting and an audit. (Record p.
2256)
8. Orvis immediately consulted with attorney Victor Lawrence and together they
conspired to obtain the SBA judgment using funds from the Orvis-Johnson partnership and
to pay exactly the amount Johnson had been negotiating through Attorney Lawrence with the
SBA to settle. Orvis purchased the SBA judgment in order to prevent Johnson from obtaining
an audit and to attempt to extinguish Johnson's partnership interest and to convert Johnsons'
profit share money for themselves - thus exploiting confidential information possessed by
Johnson's attorney, Victor Lawrence. (Record p. 2256)
9. Within days of Johnson's demand for an accounting, in August 2001, Orvis
acquired the SBA judgment in his name. Orvis used funds misappropriated from the OrvisJohnson partnership; Orvis purchased the SBA judgment against Johnson to use offensively
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to mask the preceding fraud, to attempt to extinguish the partnership and to seize profit share
distribution; and upon acquiring the SB A judgment withheld and converted the profit share
that had hitherto been distributed to the Johnsons. (Record p. 2256)
10. The SB A judgment was purchased with the counsel and participation of Victor
Lawrence, attorney for DaNell Johnson and for Johnson, in the SBA case, and in numerous
other personal matters, and in business affairs of the partnership. (Record p. 2246, Triplett
Deposition; Record p. 2390)
11. These actions by Lawrence and Orvis are in breach of attorney fiduciary duty and
partner fiduciary duty (Record p. 2243); the object of this conspiracy by Lawrence and Orvis
was to take the profit share owed to the Johnsons, which at this date would exceed $3 Million
(based on the last six months of actual profit share) and is closer to $5 Million based on
amounts concealed and converted by Orvis; Orvis and Mr. Lawrence profited by these acts
by converting Johnson's profit share and dividing it between themselves. (Record p. 2257)
12. In August 2001, after Johnson's demand for accounting, and in concert with his
purchase of the SBA judgment, Orvis brought this suit in Third District Court against
Johnson seeking a declaratory judgment that Johnson had no partnership with Orvis or
alternatively such interest was limited to 25% of two specific businesses. Orvis claimed that
all monies distributed for several years under a formula between Orvis and Johnsons, and for
which Orvis had been providing accountings monthly—were actually gratuities or a "gift"
from Orvis to the Johnsons. (Record p. 5)
13. Johnson counterclaimed for an accounting and for profits; DaNell Johnson was
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joined as a Third Party Plaintiff, and Deon Stoeckling and Victor Lawrence and others as
Third Party Defendants. (Record p. 20)
14. On March 29, 2004, Orvis moved for summary judgment. (Record p. 1949)
Therein Orvis asserted that Johnson was judicially estopped from asserting a partnership
interest with Orvis; this estoppel was based on Orvis' interpretation of a response by Johnson
in a deposition taken by the SBA in an unrelated prior federal case between the SBA and
Johnson. Orvis asserted that Johnson responded to the SBA that he did not have any
partnerships. (It is the judgment in that SBA case that was purchased by Orvis.) (Record p.
1228)
15. Johnson opposed the summary judgment motion. (Record p. 2242) Johnson
asserted that i) the quote was misconstrued, but was irrelevant regardless under the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, and ii) the doctrine of judicial estoppel, to be operative here, requires
that the prior (SBA) action and this present action be between the same parties; the prior
action involved the same issues as this action; the prior action be "successfully maintained";
and that Orvis must have detrimentally relied on the statement in the SBA deposition.
Johnson argued that Orvis met none of the requirements for the doctrine of judicial estoppel
to be applicable in this case.
16. The court heard oral argument on August 9, 2004. (Record p. 2607)
17. In its minute entry of October 20, 2004, the Court granted summary judgment to
Orvis, stating " . . . there was no question of mistake, Johnson testified as he did [in the prior
unrelated SBA deposition] so as to avoid collection efforts from the Small Business
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Administration." [Emphasis added]; the District Court found that Johnson should be
judicially estopped in this case from asserting a partnership based on the contested SBA
deposition statement; and the District Court granted summary judgment to Orvis. (Record
p. 2619)
18. Orvis drafted a Judgment and a Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law which
were executed by the District Court on October 20,2004. That findings of fact were entered
is evidence alone of improper weighing of facts as opposed only deciding issues of law
which is the only consideration for granting summary judgment. (Record p. 2623)
19. These facts do not reflect how broad ranging this assault on the Johnson by Orvis
is. The following are documented in other of the numerous cases Orvis has filed against the
Johnsons: Orvis has boasted that he would take Johnson's profit share money and would use
it to overwhelm him with litigation. (Record p. 2334) Orvis has sued Johnson in five cases,
four of which are currently pending. They are cases before Judge Bruce Jenkins in federal
court, before Judge Medley in Third District Court, this action here originally before Judge
Hanson, and before Judge McCleve in Third District Court—and this last suit now filed
seeking to take the Johnson home based on the SBA judgment he acquired. Orvis sent
Johnson mocking documents telling Johnson he has lost everything. (Record p. 2507) Orvis
has hired private investigators to surveil Johnson, and even his minor children,
photographing his home (Medley case #20041040); Lawrence has been seeking other
judgments against Johnson for himself and Orvis; Orvis is fraudulently transferring all profit
share funds he is receiving, in anticipation of these lawsuits, as Johnsons have been informed
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by Orvis contacts; Orvis used a sham dissolved LLC to conceal his identity when he sought
judgments against Johnson (Record p. 2256); Orvis is operating Lexington law firm as his
alter ego, and has been sued now, with Lawrence, in federal court in Connecticut (Record p.
2634), in a class action, etc. The appeal before the Utah Supreme Court is the only recourse
that can be unaffected by the financial club wielded by Orvis.
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals upheld the Third District Court's grant of summary judgment
for Orvis upon clearly erroneous and factually unsupported bases. The opinion claimed to
disavow a burden shifting concept adopted from Federal law, to wit, that once a proponent
of a motion has established a prima facie case of undisputed facts entitling it to summary
judgement that a burden shifts to the opponent to establish there are genuine disputes of
material facts which preclude judgment as a matter of law; but then the Court of Appeals
panel majority nonetheless adopted that very standard. Johnson argues a burden shifting
notion is misplaced because there may very well never be any burden upon an opponent of
a summary judgment if a movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or has not
alleged evidence supporting each element of a legal claim, as exists herein. The reluctantly
concurring Court of Appeals opinion of Judge Russell Bench indicates this burden shifting
notion seems to allocate burdens of proof which are required with respect to conflicts of
evidence at trial. The issue on a summary judgement is simply whether or not a genuine
dispute of material fact exists, not which party's evidence is more credible or persuasive.
Issues of fact and weight of evidence or credibility are issues to be determined by the trier
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of fact, not by summary adjudication. It is impermissible in determining a motion for
summary judgment to indulge inferences and speculation adverse to the party opposing
summary judgment or to weigh evidence and credibility as did the Third District Court and
Court of Appeals herein.
The Court of Appeals first simply disregarded that Orvis in his Summary Judgment
Motion had not even met the burden, under the Court's own burden shifting standard, to
establish a prima facie case after which and only after which, could Johnson then be required
to provide rebuttal. Orvis in his Motion simply failed to plead or offer any evidence
supporting several essential elements of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Indeed Orvis
argued on appeal that the omitted elements were not actually required elements of judicial
estoppel. The Court of Appeals in a factual and legal error incorrectly claimed that Johnson
had waived these elements by not raising them below. This 'waiver' claim is wholly refuted
by the record, but their opinion stands for a proposition that a party can obtain a summary
judgment as a matter of law with less than all of the elements of a legal doctrine alleged or
existing ~ a clearly erroneous proposition.
The Court of Appeals resolved the dispute between the parties as to what are the
required elements for application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel by listing the essential
elements in Utah of judicial estoppel, but then, while ignoring that the Orvis Motion had
failed to either plead or argue those essential elements, the Court of Appeals proceeded to
ignore two elements - reliance and bad faith - altogether as having been "waived" by
Johnson, and then grossly misapplied the other remaining elements to the undisputed and
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disputed facts of this case. The Court of Appeals, in so disposing of each of the remaining
essential elements of judicial estoppel, had to either disregard material facts in the record, or
weigh disputed material facts, or credibility, or indulge in pure speculation - all improper for
a motion for summary judgment. Those elements of judicial estoppel as have been
established and reiterated over time by this Court are: 1) the party opposing judicial estoppel
(Johnson) seeks to deny a position he or she took in a prior judicial proceeding [i.e. a prior
inconsistent statement or position]; 2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve
the same parties or their privies; 3) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve the
same subject matter; 4) the party seeking judicial estoppel (Orvis) in the subsequent judicial
proceeding must have relied on the prior inconsistent position; 5) the prior inconsistent
position must have been successfully maintained in the former action and 6) the party against
whom judicial estoppel is sought must have exhibited bad faith in making an intentional
misrepresentation.
Orvis' claim of a prior inconsistent position arose as follows: Johnson, suspecting
mis-accounting for and embezzlement of partnership profit shares by Orvis (matters
subsequently proven during discovery ), had demanded an accounting from Orvis. Orvis
promptly filed this action seeking declaratory relief of no partnership with Johnson.
Immediately before filing this action, Orvis surreptitiously acquired the SBA judgment
against Johnson. (To do this, Orvis conspired with Johnson's attorney, Lawrence, who
represented Johnson in the SBA proceedings and in the Orvis-Johnson businesses; Orvis paid
the SBA the very amount that the attorney Lawrence had, in Johnson's behalf, offered the
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SBA to settle; Orvis paid the SBA with monies diverted and embezzled from Johnson's
profit share; and Orvis and the attorney subsequently split the ongoing and diverted
Johnson's profit share.) With the acquired SBA judgment came several thousand pages of
discovery and depositions—much of it prepared and provided to the SBA by Orvis himself
and documenting the Orvis-Johnson business relationship. Orvis moved for summary
judgment against Johnson invoking judicial estoppel based on an alleged prior inconsistent
statement by Johnson found by Orvis in one of the SBA depositions. Orvis' summary
judgment motion alleged that Johnson had stated only the word "no" in answer to a
partnership question posed by the SBA, leaving out virtually all of Johnson's actual answer.
However, Johnson's actual full answer and the context of the deposition reflect that Johnson
thought he was speaking there of real estate partnerships, not the Orvis-Johnson businesses.
In opposition to Orvis' Motion for Summary Judgment, Johnson provided affidavit and
documentary evidence setting forth his understanding and the actual meaning of the SBA
quote—thus putting in direct dispute whether this quote is a prior inconsistent statement by
Johnson. This is one of several material issues of fact raised by Johnson below. The District
and Appellate Courts engaged in interpreting the meaning of the quote choosing the Orvis
interpretation upholding summary judgment and estopping Johnson from pursing his claims
for an accounting, for fraud and embezzlement and indeed even for a partnership. The first
factual dispute is the meaning of both the SBA question and Johnson's answer. It is
discernable from the context, prior and subsequent deposition questioning, and other
discovered documentation, and from Johnson's actual eyewitness testimony (indeed he's the
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only witness), not from the bare text as paraphrased or redacted and interpreted by Orvis, by
the District Court or the Court of Appeals (whose decision itself curiously did not ever set
forth the entire quote but nevertheless interpreted its meaning.) These questions involve
context, understanding, intent, and credibility, subjective fact intensive and fact disputed
issues. For application of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, a prior inconsistent statement must
first be an undisputed fact. This SBA statement is not inconsistent but whose meaning is
clearly a material fact in dispute precluding summary judgment.
A significant issue of fact (and essential element of judicial estoppel) is whether the
prior federal proceeding and instant state proceeding involve the same parties or privies.
Johnson is the only same party in the two proceedings. The opposing party in the former
lawsuit was the Federal SBA, not Orvis. Orvis claims to gain privy status by virtue of having
purchased the judgment from the SBA. The problem with his analysis is that Johnson has
claimed, as supported by deposition statements of former employees of Orvis and of the
partnership, that Orvis had misappropriated funds from the partnership he had with Johnson
and had acquired the SBA judgment using partnership funds. Utah law is clear that property
acquired with partnership funds, even if in the name of a sole partner, is partnership property.
Therefore it would be the Orvis-Johnson partnership which is the privy with the SBA, not
Orvis individually. This material fact may be disputed, but the law is not in dispute.
Another essential element and fact dispute is that the prior federal and instant state
proceeding do not in any manner involve the same subject matter. The former was a contract
guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency action brought by the SBA against Johnson.
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The SB A obtained a money judgment against Johnson in which they used a deposition in
collection efforts where the statement was made by Johnson about not having any interest
in real estate partnerships. In the present action, Orvis seeks a declaratory judgment that
would extinguish Johnson's partnership interest in their credit repair business, and Johnson
is counterclaiming for an accounting, for conspiracy, embezzlement and related claims. The
Court of Appeals misapplied this element of the doctrine by claiming that while the subject
matter of the litigations was different, the subject matter of the position about real estate
partnerships in the SB A deposition and the credit repair partnership at issue in this litigation
are the same, which is not what the element involves.
Reliance by Orvis is another essential element of judicial estoppel. Orvis did not
allege or ever argue any reliance on the SBA quote of Johnson. His conduct demonstrates the
opposite of reliance. He bought the SBA judgment immediately before filing this action,
years after the deposition and long after any time for reliance on a deposition statement.
Orvis bought the judgment to use as shield against Johnson's demand for an accounting and
to mask his fraud and only discovered the quote a year or so later when it became the
centerpiece of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Orvis obviously did not rely on or know
about the SBA quote. Orvis' only reply to this total failure to plead reliance or to factually
demonstrate it is that reliance should not be an element for application of the doctrine. The
Court of Appeals overlooked the absence of this critical element by claiming Johnson had
not raised it below. The record irrefutably demonstrates that Johnson did raise Orvis' lack
of reliance in several ways several times, despite Orvis' failure to plead it.
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The "position" of no real estate partnerships was not successfully maintained by
Johnson in the prior proceeding - another essential element - because it was never presented
to, litigated or ever adopted by the Federal Court. Judge Bruce Jenkins in the prior federal
case never heard, saw, had argued or litigated before him or resolved the question of the
existence of real estate partnerships much less the Johnson-Orvis partnership one way or the
other which is how a position gets successfully maintained. The Court of Appeals avoids this
deficiency by indulging a speculation that the SB A was passive and did not pursue collection
against Johnson so that the "position" was "successfully maintained," while ignoring that,
in fact, there was a settlement being negotiated and ultimately consummated, but by Orvis
using Lawrence's inside information about the details of the proposed settlement.
Finally, absence of mistake was presumed by the lower courts by virtue of speculating
as to Johnson's credibility and state of knowledge as an attorney at the time about the
meaning of SBA answer. This lacks any element under established Utah law required to
demonstrate intent, bad faith or absence of mistake, apart from indulging in fantasy which
is wholly unsupportable as a matter of law.
VIII. ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY

CONSTRUE AND APPLY THE RESPECTIVE PROCEDURAL BURDENS
BORNE BY OPPOSING PARTIES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
a. Because Orvis failed to factually support each element
of judicial estoppeL no prima facie case was set forth
to shift any burden to Johnson.
The majority of the panel and the reluctantly concurring opinion differ with respect
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to the non-movant's burden in resisting a summary judgment, as to whether there is a burden
shifting under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986). It is somewhat confusing and
perhaps misleading to speak of "burdens"to begin with, at least in the traditional sense. The
starting place of analysis must be the motion for summary judgment itself which is dependent
upon the existence of two things - no dispute of material facts and entitlement to a judgment
as a matter of law based on those undisputed facts. Thus, an opponent may oppose a
summary judgment in at least three ways: 1) if the movant has not established any proof of
one or more of the elements of the claim for which judgment is sought [as herein], then the
opponent has no burden at all other than to argue the law, the movant would not be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and facts are almost irrelevant at that point; 2) if the movant
has presented material facts which on their face might entitle the movant to a judgment, then
the opponent may dispute some of the material facts alleged by movant; or 3) the opponent
might allege sufficient other additional material facts as to elements of the legal claims
involved without controverting any of the movant's facts.
Discussion of "burden shifting" may be somewhat misleading and confusing.
Obviously, if the moving party has established some evidence in a form acceptable under
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) and (e) establishing all required elements, the opposing party would
need to present some evidence, but not necessarily controlling, decisive, more persuasive,
or preponderating of the contrary fact in order to demonstrate that a dispute exists. But that
is all that must be shown - that a genuine dispute exists. It is a minimal showing. It is a black
or white, yes or no question, not of weighing the shades of grey. The actual dispute itself
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does not get resolved in a summary judgment. That is antithetical to the essence of summary
adjudication. Resolving disputes of fact, weighing evidence and credibility is the province
of the jury at trial. The Panel's discussion of "burden shifting" bears further analysis and
need for clarification by this Court as to what the concept means and how it is applied in a
summary judgment motion such as the one at issue herein.
As stated by the "reluctantly" concurring opinion of Judge Bench, who felt compelled
by stare decisis where this standard had been adopted in another Court of Appeals decision,
to adopt a position taken by the majority defined in Celotex with which he disagrees, "the
burden in federal courts has been shifted to the nonmoving party, aligning the 'movant's
production burden for summary judgment to the burden of proof that party would bear at
trial.'" The majority opinion here, in fn. 7, while claiming it is not adopting the Celotex
standard nonetheless inconsistently claims that because "Orvis presented sufficient evidence
that no partnership existed because [of Johnson's prior SB A q u o t e ] . . . the burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact" which is the Celotex standard.
Utah has not adopted that Celotex standard, nor should it for a variety of reasons as
urged by Judge Bench. The burden established under the plain language of Utah R. Civ. Pro.
56 as reiterated by Judge Bench in dissent in Shaw Resources Limited, L.L.C. v. Pruitt,
Gusgee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App. 313 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). He therein stated:
[T]he traditional rule is that summary judgment is available only where the moving
party can affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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The burden in a Rule 56 motion is a simple yes or no question - are there material facts in
dispute or not? Only if material facts are not in dispute, then do they entitle the movant to
judgment as a matter of law?
The movant for any motion always has the "burden of persuasion" under established
rule and principles of law. This should not be confused with a "burden of proof' which enters
an entirely different realm. The accepted standards for burdens of proof in various contexts
are a scintilla, substantial evidence, some credible evidence, probable cause, preponderance
of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt and proof to a
certainty. In a summary judgment, the movant to the extent there is a burden, has the latter
highest standard and the opponent the first and lowest standard, i.e. only to show that a
dispute exists for a jury or fact finder to resolve. When discussion is made about "burden
shifting," then it becomes a matter of weighing conflicting evidence and/or credibility of
witnesses reserved for a jury and deciding what is more persuasive, but this, the jury's job,
was precisely the approach erroneously engaged in by the Court of Appeals. This is so
entirely at odds with every precept of summary adjudication established in Utah that it would
require overruling legions of cases which are based upon traditional standards of summary
judgment adjudication. These axiomatic standards include:
1. Summary judgment is improper when there are disputed issues of material fact, Salt
Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004).
2. The facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the one opposing summary
judgment, Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005).
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3. It is improper to weigh credibility in deciding a motion for summary judgment,
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.1996).
A summary judgment is not the time to determine who has the better evidence, but only to
determine whether any opposing evidence exists.
Moreover, a fundamental defect in this case is that the prima facie case the panel
suggests as the starting place for burden shifting was not met by Orvis in the first instance.
Orvis presented no factual support for any element of judicial estoppel, apart from an alleged
prior inconsistent statement, in his summary judgment motion and pleadings. 1 The panel
thereby seems to imply judicial estoppel is invoked and a burden shifts to Johnson to negate
all elements, even those Orvis did not bother to plead, by allowing Orvis to merely recite a
single element of a prior inconsistent statement and not having to demonstrate any of the
other elements of the doctrine. Moreover, the panel sidestepped the very real and substantial
dispute as to that one fact as to whether that prior real estate partnership statement was in fact
inconsistent with Johnson's current position by weighing the disputed evidence and
Johnson's motive, credibility and inferring intent.
Orvis neither supported the remaining elements of judicial estoppel by Affidavit nor
did he argue them by his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement. He
did not make out a prima facie case to invoke judicial estoppel for Johnson to rebut in the
first instance. Regardless of whether Orvis' burden to prove entitlement to summary
judgment under Rule 56 is met by a mere assertion of judicial estoppel with nothing further
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and a burden was therefore shifted to Johnson to negate elements not pled, in this case
Johnson fully set out and argued genuine disputes of material issues of fact central to the
judicial estoppel analysis. The failure of Orvis to raise and factually support necessary
elements of judicial estoppel is only overcome as the panel seems to indicate by (incorrectly)
asserting that these necessary elements of the doctrine need not be pled or presented by
Orvis, the moving party. This is clear error.
b. The District Court and Court of Appeals erred by adopting the most
extreme view possible against Johnson, of the facts of the case
rather than viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant
Johnson as required in considering summary judgment.
Judge Hanson adopted the most extreme view he could possibly adopt against Johnson
in viewing the facts. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the facts are to be
viewed in the light most favorable to the one opposing summary judgment, Anderson
Development

Co., supra. Rather than utilizing this "perspective" the Court did the

opposite—there was not even an attempt at a middle ground here, let alone a recognition that
these facts must be weighed in that light most favorable toward Johnson. This is reflected
by the Court's statement that Johnson "lied" to the SBA, urging Orvis to go to the U.S.
Attorney. (Hearing on Motions January 29,2003 Before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
p. 9, included as Addendum exhibit 2) Indeed this outrageous reflection of the Judge's
sentiment was stated by the Judge at the earliest possible moment in the case and before the
court had actually read any pleading by Johnson or reviewed the claims of the complaint.
Further, in his Minute Entry the Judge states "there is "no question" here on the facts but that
Johnson was "avoiding creditors" To make such extreme statements requires the Judge to
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view the facts exclusively in favor of Orvis.
That view of the facts most favorable to Johnson is that the SBA quote is
misconstrued by Orvis, and that Johnson was responding to a series of questions by the SBA
covering the standard list of assets, i.e., stocks, bonds, insurance, etc., and that Johnson
presumed he was answering about real estate partnership matters and explicitly said so in the
full answer.
Such a view would have precluded summary judgment, but the lower courts failed to
take the view required by the standard required to grant summary judgment. The lower courts
were in error in this regard and granting of summary judgment was improper.
c. The District Court and Court of Appeals improperly weighed
the credibility of the parties.
While it is wrong to rule on one set of facts over another in summary judgment,
Winegar v. Froerer et. al, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991), since Johnson's set of facts involves
the issue of his credibility, the District Court and Court of Appeal's rejection of his version
of the facts and attributing motives and intent, is in repudiation of his credibility as well.
Weighing parties' credibility is also improper - Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct.
App.1989) - and it is another manifest error by the lower courts requiring this Court to
reverse the lower courts' grant of summary judgment.
The trial court and Court of Appeals are extensively experienced and it would seem
beyond question they should understand the standard for granting summary judgment in the
face of disputed facts. Nonetheless, these lower courts wholly abandoned the most
fundamental of standards in granting summary judgment. If there is a factual dispute and
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weighing credibility in itself indicates a dispute, then summary judgment is inappropriate,
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995). That was error and it should
be reversed.
ISSUE NO. 2:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY

APPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN THIS CASE.
Manifest error is clear in this case where the evidence of the partnership is so
overwhelming and the District Court decided to ignore all of it on the basis of a "no"
response to a vague and ambiguous question posed by the SB A in a post judgment deposition
in an unrelated case. Manifest error exists where the lower court clearly misapplies the law
to the facts of the case - Adams v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.1990). The district
court and Court of Appeals manifestly erred in the following ways:
1. The District Court and Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel
to the facts of this case. Not a single of the five necessary elements are present to invoke the
doctrine.
2. The District Court improperly granted summary judgment where genuine issues of
fact exist, and in doing so the District Court and Court of Appeals wrongly adopted the most
extreme view of the facts against Johnson, rather than view those facts in the light most
favorable to Johnson; and the District Court and Court of Appeals improperly weighed the
credibility of Johnson; all of which constitute manifest error by the lower courts.
a. The elements of judicial estoppel.
The panel rejected the Orvis position and agreed with Johnson as to what the elements
ofjudicial estoppel are in Utah. Unfortunately, the panel then proceeded to entirely misapply
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these element to the facts in the record and to governing law. The necessary elements were
identified and should be affirmed by this Court to clarify apparent confusion about them that
the elements of judicial estoppel required to apply the doctrine are those required by Tracy
Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 132 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1942) as supplemented
by 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P. 3d 1082 (Utah 2005),
which can be summarized as: 1) the party opposing judicial estoppel seeks to deny a position
he or she took in a prior judicial proceeding [i.e. a prior inconsistent statement or position];
2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve the same parties or their privies; 3)
the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve the same subject matter; 4) the party
seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent judicial proceeding must have relied on the
former testimony; 5) the position must have been successfully maintained in the former
action and 6) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought must have exhibited bad
faith in making an intentional misrepresentation.
b. No prima facie case was established by Orvis.
The Court of Appeals panel decision did not even bother to analyze two necessary
elements - bad faith and reliance, falsely claiming these had not been raised below (refuted
in discussion below) and were therefore "waived." The analysis given to the existence of a
prior inconsistent statement was woefully superficial and refuted by the record or the law as
were the elements of same parties or privies, same subject matter and successful
maintenance.
Whether or not Johnson argued application of a particular element required to apply
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judicial estoppel does not mean that such element is unnecessary or that a district court may
overlook it. A defective district court decision invoking a legal doctrine whose necessary
factual elements are lacking and not even pled is manifest error. That decision is not immune
from attack because a non-moving party is alleged not to have raised a necessary element,
even it that were the case, which the record reflects is not. A moving party who does not even
invoke any fact in support of a necessary element cannot be entitled to a summary judgment
as a matter of law. Utah Appellate Courts routinely strike down or dismiss a plethora of cases
where there is a failure to plead, prove or demonstrate any one necessary element of a legal
doctrine.2 Indeed, contrary to the panel's conclusion that Orvis made out a prima facie claim
that Johnson had to rebut, Orvis's Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit neither pled nor
argued any of the elements of judicial estoppel other than a prior inconsistent statement.3 The
Court is respectfully asked to revisit Orvis' summary judgment pleadings and will clearly see
Orvis wholly failed to factually plead or argue any element of judicial estoppel other than a
prior inconsistent statement and the District Court and Court of Appeals failed to apply the
doctrine with all of its requirements, as a matter of law. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245
(Utah 1985) held that "To make out a prima facie case, Burton must show compliance with

2

Cline v. State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 142 P.3d 127 (Utah App.
2005); Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Utah App. 2004); Bennett v. Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003); Thurston v. Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391 (Utah App. 2003); Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327
(Utah 1997); Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989); Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677 (Utah
App. 1989)
3
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all of the . . . elements."
i. No prior inconsistent statement exists -The central factual issue here is the meaning
and interpretation of an answer by Johnson to a question posed in an SBA deposition
pursuant to a judgment in federal court.
In his motion for summary judgment, Orvis asserted only the existence of a prior
inconsistent statement by Johnson to the SBA made in an unrelated federal case. (Record p.
1942). This prior inconsistent statement alone, argued Orvis, sufficiently invokes the doctrine
of judicial estoppel to estop Johnson from asserting his partnership claims with Orvis. The
SBA had obtained a judgment against Johnson and was conducting a post-judgment
deposition of Johnson. Johnson was asked about partnerships and he is alleged by Orvis to
have stated he had no partnerships including Orvis-Johnson businesses. Orvis argued that
the interpretation of this quote was that Johnson repudiated any partnership in Orvis-Johnson
businesses, or was otherwise lying to the SBA. Johnson, in opposition, argued that this quote
did not relate to Orvis-Johnson businesses and was intended by Johnson to refer only to real
estate ventures. Johnson, the only witness, submitted his affidavit as to the meaning of the
SBA quote, and submitted documents and other deposition quotes to establish the context of
the deposition, his understanding of the question and his intent in answering the SBA.
Appellant Johnson placed in dispute the Orvis interpretation of the SBA quote and asserted
that the SBA quote, was not a prior inconsistent statement sufficient to invoke judicial
estoppel. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both adopted the Orvis interpretation
of this quote and granted and upheld summary judgment respectively. Both Courts observed
that Johnson was an attorney and implied that status gave Appellant Johnson some special
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insight to the question posed by the SBA and thus weighed his credibility.
While the quote itself is ultimately not an issue because it is made wholly irrelevant
by application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, nonetheless, that quote, together with the
application of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel became central to this appeal as it is the single
thing relied on by the lower courts.
Orvis did not know of the SBA quote until a year after this litigation commenced
when it was located among the discovery materials purchased by Orvis along with the SBA
judgment. He bought the SBA judgment only a few days before commencing litigation.
The history of the SBA judgment is instructive and aids in understanding the short
SBA quote. In 1997, the SBA obtained a judgment against Johnson. He was deposed
approximately four times and his wife, who sat on a board of an Orvis-Johnson company and
was also one of the partners, was deposed once. Johnson's wife was represented in the
litigation by attorney Victor Lawrence of Lexington Law Firm at her deposition. He also
represented the Orvis-Johnson enterprises (a client of which was Lexington Law Firm as
well). Attorney Lawrence also represented Johnson to the SBA over a period of time. He
participated in negotiating a proposed settlement to the SBA of the Johnson judgment. The
SBA requested discovery be produced from some of the Orvis-Johnson businesses to
ascertain the relationships of Johnson, his wife, and others to the Johnson-Orvis businesses.
Orvis and attorney Lawrence produced extensive documents to the SBA outlining these
business relationships. The SBA had asked Johnson, and his spouse, in previous depositions
about the Orvis-Johnson business relationships and the SBA had received document
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production.
In its 1999 deposition of Johnson, the SB A asked Johnson about the Orvis-Johnson
businesses, and about his wife's relationships to various Orvis-Johnson businesses. At one
point in the deposition, the SBA asked Johnson a series of general questions about assets
such as insurance, stocks, bonds, real estate, etc. Johnson was asked if he had any
partnerships. He understood the question to involve real estate and he answered that he did
not formally set up real estate partnerships. It is this quote upon which Orvis relies.
Orvis' interaction with the SBA is also instructive and follows: Johnson, suspecting
mis-accounting for and embezzlement of partnership profit share by Orvis (matters
subsequently proven during discovery), had demanded an accounting from Orvis. Orvis
promptly filed this action seeking declaratory relief of no partnership with Johnson.
Immediately before filing this action, Orvis surreptitiously acquired the SBA judgment
against Johnson. Orvis concealed his identity from the SBA by using a defunct Utah LLC,
and then immediately conveying the judgment to himself in his name. To do all this, Orvis
consulted and conspired with Johnson's attorney, Lawrence of Lexington Law Firm, who,
as mentioned represented Johnson to the SBA, Mrs. Johnson to the SBA, the Johnsons to the
Orvis-Johnson businesses, etc. Orvis offered to pay the SBA the precise amount that Johnson
and Lawrence were negotiating to pay the SBA to settle the judgment, Orvis having obtained
that information from attorney Lawrence. Further, Orvis paid the SBA with monies diverted
and embezzled from Johnson profit share, and Orvis and attorney Lawrence subsequently
split the ongoing and diverted Johnson profit share. Orvis acquired the SBA judgment to
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shield him from Johnson's demand for an accounting and claims of embezzlement and as a
means to attempt to extinguish Johnson's partnership interest. Johnson has documented, in
the record, the actual purpose of Orvis' acquisition of the SB A judgment by the blunt
demand of Orvis' attorney, Dan Berman. The day after Orvis filed this case, Orvis seized and
cut off all profit share that had been allocated for several years among the partners, and Orvis
arranged a meeting at the offices of his attorney Dan Berman who frankly stated that Orvis
and Lawrence had acquired the SB A judgment against Johnson and offered to settle it and
extinguish the Johnson-Orvis partnership. Johnson's responsive letter to Berman addresses
this Ex. 18 in Addendum).
Orvis was nonetheless still unaware of the SBA quote. With the acquired SBA
judgment came several thousand pages of discovery and depositions—much of it prepared
and provided to the SBA by Orvis himself and documenting the Orvis-Johnson business
relationship. After some discovery and a year into the case, Orvis moved for summary
judgment against Johnson invoking judicial estoppel based on the alleged prior inconsistent
statement by Johnson located by Orvis
At issue here, raised by Orvis in his summary judgment motion below is the
interpretation of the 63 word quote, given in the 1999 SBA deposition. To support this,
Orvis, in his Summary Judgment Motion, lifts only the single word "no" from Johnson's
more lengthy quote. Orvis' version of the quote, as stated to the District Judge below is "Q.
Do you have any partnerships? A. No." (Record p. 1231 line 16). The actual quote is 63
words long:
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:

Q. Do you have any interest in any partnership?
A. No, I mean you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody but I don't
have a partnership or set up a partnership or an L.L.C. You know if I get a deal I say,
[h]ey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and buy
a lot. [Emphasis added]

(Record p. 2424; 1231-1232, Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 30 lines 16-25 and p. 31,
lines 1 -24). Johnson in his opposition memorandum asserts that he understood this particular
question to be about real estate partnerships as the actual words in his answer reflect. Johnson
argued by affidavit and reference to other deposition statements and related documents
submitted under oath that this particular question came in a series of short standard questions
about stocks, bonds, insurance, real estate limited partnerships, partnerships, etc., and came
after discussion of the Orvis enterprises earlier in the deposition, (which would again be
touched on later in the deposition) and that Johnson had discussed the Orvis enterprises in
other earlier depositions, as had his wife. (Record p. 2259). Johnson 's understanding of what
the SBA was asking him was not about the Orvis matters which they were already aware of.
Nor does the plain language of the answer on its face state the negative proposition being
attributed that no specific partnerships of any nature exist but is in terms of describing
Johnson's general usual routine in the abstract, what was ordinary, in the conduct of real
estate joint endeavors.
This one word "No" lifted from the larger original quote, was presented in the Orvis
memo to the District Court as the entire and complete quote. (There is evidence that the
District Court itself did not realize that the quote was actually lengthy and that contained
within the quote are indeed references to real property—not the Orvis enterprises—and that
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the District Court believed the disingenuous excerpted "no" as constituting the complete and
full answer by Johnson). (Addendum Ex. 3 p. 15, line 1). Orvis, after providing the
incomplete "No" quote as evidence, then asserted, in the memo, that "Johnson lied to the
[SB A];" 4 and that the doctrine of judicial estoppel was to stop such "lying." (Record p.
1946). The District Court adopted the Orvis interpretation and made a finding in the Minute
Entry of November 23, 2004 that Johnson was "avoiding creditors" by this SBA quote, and
interpreted this quote to mean that Johnson was responding about the Orvis enterprises—not
about real estate partnerships as Johnson asserts. (Record p. 2620). Further, the District
Court's explicit finding, in its Minute Entry, that the prior SBA statement was not a
"mistake" thus made a factual ruling on the bad faith/mistake requirement of judicial
estoppel—a critical material issue hotly in dispute, 3D Const, and Development,

L.L.C.,

supra.
The Court of Appeals, like the District Court, engaged in interpreting the SBA quote.
The Panel states "[W]e fail to see how this deposition statement can be interpreted as
anything but a denial of interest in any type of partnership." [Emphasis added]. (Curiously,
in a decision ostensibly concerned with the central issue of the meaning of the SBA quote,
the Panel decision does not ever set forth the entire quote and in fact divides it up, separates
the word "No" and completely omits entirely the critical interpretive, modifying and

4

The Orvis interpretation of the ambiguous SBA quote supporting his summary
judgment is that "Mr. Johnson has lied [to the SBA about his partnership interest with
Orvis]." [Emphasis added.] (The Court's Record appears to lack this pleading - please
see Addendum Ex. 1, Johnson's Memo in Support of the Motion for Summary
Disposition, Ex. 6, Orvis Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 7).
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qualifying language of "I mean you know" following that word "No," reflecting Johnson's
thought process and uncertainty in trying to answer the question). The Court not only edits,
and misinterprets the full quote, which on its face supports Johnson's interpretation, but the
Court ignores or dismisses the evidence in the record (cited, argued and preserved below by
Johnson) of the prior deposition statements, other discovery provided to the SBA, and
Johnson's own testimony (as the sole witness) as to the meaning of the SBA quote. The
Panel, like the District Court, observes that Johnson is an attorney, gratuitously noting the
status of his law license in Utah, (and inadvertently revealing, perhaps, an unspoken basis
for its ruling). The Court indulges in the speculation that this somehow must have affected
his understanding of the SBA question, and anticipating this Orvis controversy two years
before this litigation.
This type of misquoting both by the Court of Appeals and more so in Orvis' and the
District Court's reliance only on the truncated "No" is transparent and ethically dubious. It
would seem to give most courts pause. It simply strains credulity and is incorrect to claim
Johnson's response is anything other than about real estate ventures. Johnson explicitly
referenced "lots" and specific ventures he had engaged in previously, for instance, in Summit
County. This is not "unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions," as speculated by the Court
of Appeals panel, it is the plain language of the statement itself. The opinion indulges a
speculation here which at the same time it accuses Johnson of doing in defending his
interpretations of the question and answer. Johnson has offered a logical and documented
explanation for the meaning of his answer and his interpretation of the question. The panel
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chooses to simply ignore this dispute of material fact and weigh evidence to reach their own
conclusion about the weight of this evidence. Indeed the basis of the panel and District
Court's conclusion that 1) because Johnson was a lawyer, therefore 2) he must have actually
understood the question to be something other than how he says he understood it, and 3) that
he deliberately intended to mislead with a deceptive answer is actually the panel's own
"unsubstantiated opinion and conclusion" wherein they indulge a whole series of inferences
adverse to the opponent of the summary judgment, Johnson. This is impermissible in itself.
The Court of Appeals claimed, "Nothing in Johnson's affidavit supports his assertion
that his response in the SBA deposition to the question about partnerships was based on his
belief that it referred only to partnerships in real estate," which assertion is defied by the
plain language of the full quote itself! Unless this statement is somehow characterized as an
"admission," the Court of Appeals would not give to a litigant the right afforded by the Utah
Rules of Evidence given to every witness in any case to explain any perceived inconsistency,
UtahR. Evid. 613(b).
Despite the differing interpretations, both the District Court judge and Court of
Appeals panel improperly ruled on this fact—the meaning of this quote—and entered
summary judgment based on it. They attribute meaning and context on their own weighing
of credibility to indicate that Johnson was "avoiding" the SBA creditor. To be satisfied that
Johnson was avoiding creditors, the lower courts were indeed accepting the version of the
facts presented by Orvis and rejecting Johnson's version that he never disavowed his
partnership interest in the credit repair businesses with Orvis. To be satisfied of one set of
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facts over another involves a weighing of the two sets of facts. This of course is not
permissible, as a matter of law, on a motion for summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer et.
al, supra. The disparate meanings of the SB A quote are a central focus of the case rendering
it not susceptible to summary judgment.
ii. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for judicial estoppel; Orvis did
not rely on any statement made by Johnson during his SBA deposition.
The Court of Appeals claimed not to deal with the element of reliance because
purportedly the panel erroneously asserted that reliance was not raised below by Johnson.
Nonetheless the panel discussed reliance at some length as being a required element for
application of judicial estoppel, but in doing so made some interesting observations directly
applicable to this case. The panel recites in fn. 4 that "Other jurisdictions have determined
that. .. reliance [is] not [an] essential element of the judicial estoppel doctrine, " and then
cites Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2002) for the
proposition that "T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial
system not the litigants." The opinion goes on to recite that there has been disagreement with
reliance as an element stated by several dissents in Utah, including by Justice Durham in
Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) that, "[B]ecause judicial estoppel has a strong and
independent public policy justification, the party asserting the judicial estoppel should not
have to show either prejudice or reliance." This "not a tool" of private party vs. judicial
integrity/public policy distinction is interesting herein in that even these views pinpoint
exactly why judicial estoppel should not be applied in this case regardless of Orvis' complete
lack of reliance. Namely the doctrine of judicial estoppel is being used as a tool by a private
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litigant not to promote judicial integrity and to expose the truth but instead to hide
embezzlement and fraud and to conceal the truth precisely contrary to any notion of public
policy being served. Reliance by the prior court itself in the prior proceeding is under any
analysis an element of reliance under the "successfully maintained" requirement.
Nonetheless, as the majority of this Court has consistently determined, as with any
form of estoppel, an essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental reliance. Orvis, as
his offensive strategy,-tries to claim that Johnson's ambiguous SBA statement about "no"
partnerships is a disavowal of his partnership interest with Orvis, but unless Orvis actually
relied on that statement made to the SBA, that ambiguous SBA statement cannot operate to
estop Johnson from asserting his partnership claims. The District Court ignored this reliance
element altogether. In Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App.1989), the Court of
Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's holding on this issue:
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390
(1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial estoppel must
show that he or she has done something or omitted to do something in reliance on the
other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are
different from those upon which he or she relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel
where there was no reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at
390-91. However, in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046
(1971), the court clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been
determined. [Emphasis added.]
The glaring error with the District Court's ruling is the blatant failure by Orvis to
establish that "he . . . has done something or omitted to do something in reliance on [Mr.
Johnson's] testimony in the earlier proceeding," much less that he did not have "equal
knowledge of the facts." Orvis has never, in any way, pled or claimed reliance on the SBA
-31-

statement—not in his motion for summary judgment, nor in his affidavit, nor in any other
pleading. Nor is it possible to infer reliance by Orvis because there are no facts, actual or
alleged, anywhere in this case, from which reliance may be inferred. The failure to allege any
prima facie case that includes reliance, much less provide even nominal facts in support of
this essential element of reliance renders the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel wholly inapplicable
as a matter of law. For this reason alone, the District Court and Court of Appeals have
committed manifest error.
Further, claiming that Johnson did not raise reliance is simply false. Johnson did
clearly raise it.5 For example, at the hearing before Judge Hanson on the elements necessary
to support judicial estoppel which are lacking herein, counsel stated at R 2508 - Tr. p. 18,1.
1-2, "that's another party, that detrimentally changed its position by reason of Salt Lake's
inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress," and at R. 2508 - Tr. p. 19,1. 3-6,
"The party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed its position. Here
there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis." [Emphasis added].Johnson 's Memorandum to the
District Court cited the cases of Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 34 P. 3d 180 (Utah
2001), Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995), and Tracy,
supra, for the elements of judicial estoppel, which all require reliance. In any event, judicial
estoppel is inapplicable herein as additionally held in connection with reliance by Silver Fork,
"The rule of judicial estoppel does not apply . . . when the knowledge or means of knowledge
of both parties is equal." Orvis per se would have equal or better knowledge about his

5

R. 2279-2281, R. 2508 -Tr. p. 18, 1. 103, 23-24, p. 19, 1. 3-12
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partnership with Johnson.
Orvis' actual actions are the antithesis of reliance. First Orvis had never heard of
Johnson's SBA statement until after he filed this action and it was raised in summary
judgment. He only acquired the SBA judgment (and the depositions therein for review
containing the quote) days before filing this action. Even if Orvis could now point to some
evidence of reliance, his reliance must still be justifiable, and reliance on this 63 word quote
to alter the complex Orvis-Johnson relationship could not be justified.
But Orvis has never manifested reliance. He has done the opposite. Three years after
the SBA statement, Orvis went out to the SBA bought the SB A judgment (in conspiracy with
Johnson's attorney Victor Lawrence). In July of 2001, Johnson had demanded an accounting
with a CPA because the Johnsons suspected fraud. (Record p. 2256) Orvis, fearing that an
accounting for the partnership would reveal his fraud, consulted with Mr. Lawrence, the
Johnsons' attorney, (Record p. 2246) and these two conspired to acquire the SBA judgment
against Johnson—the same judgment for which they had provided discovery. Mr. Lawrence
knew, from being Johnson's attorney and consulting with him about the SBA matter, that
Johnson was negotiating to settle the judgment for the sum of $30,000. Exploiting that inside
knowledge about their client and partner, Orvis and Lawrence determined to offer the SBA
the same amount to buy the judgment but not to settle it for Johnson, but to buy it and use
it to extinguish the Orvis-Johnson partnership and conceal the ongoing fraud (Record p.
2257). Orvis cannot claim to have expended money to pay the SBA since he used money
misappropriated from the Johnson profit share. Attorney Victor Lawrence (with the
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knowledge of Orvis and while working also for Orvis) actually represented and counseled
DaNell Johnson in her deposition by the SB A where, at his directed questioning, she laid out
to the SBA the profit share distribution—this only months before Johnson's last SBA
deposition. (Record p. 2390)
Indeed, Mr. Orvis' original counsel herein, Dan Berman (also Victor Lawrence's
counsel) summoned Johnson to a meeting at his office on the day he filed this lawsuit. Mr.
Berman informed Johnson that Orvis and Lawrence had acquired the SBA judgment to use
against Johnson and would collect and offered to exchange the judgment if Johnson would
abandon the Orvis-Johnson partnership. This exchange is confirmed in the letter to Mr.
Berman from Johnson. (Record p. 2515). This is hardly a story of detrimental reliance by
an unfortunate Orvis. Orvis bought the SB A judgment because he knew that, indeed, he did
have a partnership with the Johnsons and he was searching for a means to avoid it. Thus, the
SBA judgment was acquired by Orvis and Lawrence to be used against their partners and
clients, and to hide fraud.
Further, after November 1999, the date of the SBA deposition, Orvis did not change
his position from being a partner with the Johnsons to a position that he had no partnership
with Johnson. Instead Orvis did the opposite. Profit share distribution (distributed by Orvis)
not only continued uninterrupted on a monthly basis but increased dramatically over the next
two years up to as high as $35,000 per month just before Orvis filed this lawsuit; Orvis and
Johnson continued to execute and exchange written documents regarding the partnership, and
their active course of performance after the SBA statement also evidences the ongoing
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partnership. There is no evidence of reliance by Orvis on the SBA quote - detrimental or
otherwise. Summary judgment must be reversed because Orvis failed to plead or prove this
essential element of judicial estoppel. "There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is
the controlling principal here.
iii. The parties in the prior federal case and the instant state case are not the same and
any privy with the SBA is not Orvis but is the Orvis-Johnson partnership.
For judicial estoppel to apply, the parties in the prior case and in this case must be the
same or privies. The parties are not the same nor privies for three reasons:
i.) The actual parties are not the same.
ii.) Orvis, who claims to be a privy to the SBA because he purchased the SB A judgment, did
so with monies misappropriated from the partnership, and he is not, therefore, the "privy"
because the SBA judgment would actually be the property of the partnership, which would
be the "privy";
iii.) The SBA judgment was purchased in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duties
and is void in Orvis' hands.
The parties in the prior case were Johnson, the defendant therein, and the United
States Government (the SBA), the plaintiff. The SBA was the opposing party in the former
action. Orvis is not the SBA. The parties in this current matter were Johnson, DaNell
Johnson, and Orvis, Victor Lawrence and Dean Stoeckling. The parties are clearly not the
same in the unrelated federal and state actions. However, Orvis claimed, and the Court of
Appeals agreed by finding that Orvis was a privy with the SBA because "All Star Financial
assigned the judgment solely to Orvis, an undisputed fact evidenced by the judgment
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attached to Johnson's affidavit."
The facts of record show that the SBA judgment was purchased by an expired and
defunct Utah limited liability company, All Star Financial, LLC (owned by a relative of an
Orvis partner and party herein-Deon Stoeckling). All Star was used by Orvis to conceal his
identity from the SBA.6 Within 24 hours after the purchase, All Star assigned the SBA
judgment to Orvis. Orvis used the Johnson profit share monies to pay the SBA. This plan was
proposed and orchestrated by Victor Lawrence with Orvis. Lawrence, as Johnson's attorney
to the SBA, knew the amount Johnson was negotiating with the SBA to pay to settle the
judgment and that was the amount Orvis paid.
Whether the purchaser of the judgment is a privy to the SBA is not the dispute raised
with respect to Orvis' party or privy status, but instead that Orvis was embezzling partnership
money and purchased the SBA judgment using partnership funds wrongly taken from the
partnership and used a defunct "straw man" to disguise his identity. Johnson pointed out to
the District Court that Orvis could not be a privy because Orvis does not actually own the
SBA judgment. Having been purchased with misappropriated partnership funds, under well
established Utah law, the SBA judgment would be the property not of Orvis but of the
partnership, even if held in Orvis' name.
The panel overlooked Johnson's detailed facts and legal arguments raised below that
Orvis is not in fact the privy with the SBA - a necessary element. Johnson has asserted from
the outset that Orvis purchased the judgment with monies wrongfully taken from the

6
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partnership and stated this in his Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Tflj4, 52, 53
and 54.7 This was supported by sworn deposition testimony of Orvis employee Thomas
Triplett (Record p.855-875), Orvis partner Jade Griffin (Record p. 877-884), and attorney
Lawrence employee, Will Vigil (Record p. 2285-2288). 8
Utah statute and case law are well-established and long-standing that assets purchased
with partnership monies, even if the assets are held in the name of an individual partner, are
the property of the partnership. Utah Code Anno. §48-1-5 provides, in part, "Unless the
contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property."
The statute was enacted in 1953 and has been unchanged since then. This current statute's
substance has uniformly been the holding of Utah courts on partnership property beginning
with Deming v. Moss, 123 P. 971 (Utah 1912):
The law with respect to what, prima facie at least, constitutes partnership property as
between partners is well stated in 22 A. & E. Ency., L. (2d Ed.) 91, in the following
words: "All property brought with funds belonging to a firm is, prima facie at least,
the property of the partnership, though the title to such property be taken in the
individual names of one or more of the partners."
See Frandsen v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Utah App. 1987). Deming was quoted as
standing for the rule that is "settled in this jurisdiction" and "amply supported by numerous
authorities" in Staatsv. Staats, 226 P. 677 (Utah 1924). Utah's current statute was referenced
in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P. 2d 606 (Utah 1976):
Our statute provides that when property is purchased with partnership funds it
becomes property of the partnership, unless a contrary intention is shown. This is true
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See also Record 2098-2101, 2285-2367, 2389-2394
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regardless of the form of the transaction, including where the purchase is made in the
name of one or more of the partners as individuals without reference to the
partnership.
Accordingly, this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Orvis. Since this is
a genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether the parties
are the same or privies precludes summary judgment as a matter of law. It is not permissible
to weigh two versions of facts on a motion for summary judgment, Winegar v. Froerer et.
ah, supra.
Further, Johnson, as partner, charges Orvis and Mr. Victor Lawrence with fraud,
conspiracy to defraud, breach of both partner and attorney fiduciary duties, embezzlement,
theft and criminal conversion by taking partnership assets and purchasing the SBA judgment
to mask and extinguish his own ongoing fraud. There is significant testimony to this effect.
The substance of and references to these depositions were raised and argued before the
District Court in the relevant pleadings. Such acts would void the SB A judgment in the hands
of Orvis, and he would not be a privy. See Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980
P.2d 208 (Utah 1999). Also argued in the district court, is that Mr. Victor Lawrence and
Orvis manage, work for, and profit by Lexington law firm, Mr. Lawrence's firm. Mr.
Lawrence was also the attorney for the Johnsons in the SBA matter and in partnership
matters. It is unethical for Lawrence, and for Orvis, in conspiracy with him, to acquire a
judgment against a client and voids the judgment acquisition, Snow, Nuffer, supra; Walter
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by the
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District Court and the Court of Appeals in its grant of summary judgment to Orvis.
iv. The subject matter of the prior federal case is different from the subject matter of
the present state case.
The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency action
brought by the SB A against Johnson.9 The SB A obtained a money judgment against Johnson.
The SB A deposition was a post-judgment collection action. In the present action, Orvis seeks
a declaratory judgment that would extinguish Johnson's partnership interest in their joint
business, and Johnson is counterclaiming for an accounting, for conspiracy, and related
claims. The subject matters of the prior federal action and this state action are clearly
different. The Court of Appeals engages a fiction to claim the subject matter of the two
unrelated lawsuits were the same by claiming that the issue of the existence of the OrvisJohnson partnership was in dispute regardless of the actual "subject matter" of the litigation
itself.
This distinction between the subject matter of the prior SBA case and this case is
made clearer by a 1989 case, Masters v. Worsley, supra, wherein the Court of Appeals stated
the Utah Supreme Court had clarified the doctrine of judicial estoppel by holding that "the
doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues
actually litigated, not those which could have been determined," citing Richards v. Hodson,
26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971). The only subject matter litigated, and thus
cognizable, in the prior SBA action were the foreclosure action and the guarantee contract.

9

The SBA extensively litigated mortgage deficiency action centered primarily on
the issue of whether the differing federal limitation period for pursuing SBA backed
mortgage deficiencies trumped Utah's three month trust deed statute limitation period.
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The specific Orvis-Johnson business relationship in this case was not litigated in the prior
SBA action, and so, Orvis fails the "same subject matter" test. He may not invoke judicial
estoppel.
v. The prior position must be "successfully maintained" in federal court for judicial
estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no position maintained.
A necessary element for application of judicial estoppel that Orvis must have
demonstrated is that the alleged prior inconsistent statement of no partnership with Orvis
derived from the SBA quote was successfully maintained by Johnson before the trier in that
prior federal case. The panel opinion claims this element was met because the SBA did not
take action to collect its judgment by going against Johnson's interest in the partnership. That
is a false assumption to begin with. Neither Orvis nor the Court of Appeals knows what the
SBA did or did not do and there was no evidence presented by Orvis or facts alleged
regarding this. Moreover, the SBA did collect on its judgment. 10 However, this "passive
SBA" argument is not what is required by this element to "successfully maintain" a position.
As explained in 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., supra:
"Under judicial estoppel, fa person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or their
privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully
maintained.'" Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, 26, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390
(1942))
Moreover, judicial estoppel is inappropriate where the party against
whom judicial estoppel is sought did not successfully maintain the inconsistent
position in the prior proceedings. See Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339,353 (Utah
1996) (explaining "the rule followed in Utah requires that the party seeking judicial
relief must have prevailed upon its statement in the earlier proceeding.").

'see R. 2282, ^[50, R. 2508 - Tr. p. 17,1.10-14
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It is error to suggest that a non-action by the SBA constitutes having successfully
maintained a position of "no partnership"with Orvis or having "prevailed" before the
Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Bruce Jenkins, the federal judge presiding over the SBA
case. Judge Jenkins never considered or ruled upon the position. The argument indulges a
presumption as to what was in the SBA mind. The Court of Appeals cannot know what was
in the SBA mind as (the Court speculates) the SBA sat passively, doing nothing.
While the Court of Appeals concludes that Orvis met this element of "successful
maintenance" because the SBA was passive and did not collect, in truth even that assertion
is false. The SBA actually did collect on its judgment for the exact amount negotiated with
Johnson. Indeed, Orvis himself paid the SBA and in fact, paid the exact amount that Johnson
had negotiated with the SBA to pay off the SBA judgment. Attorney Lawrence having
wrongly revealed this confidential attorney-client information to this other adverse party,
Orvis.
Masters v. Worsley, supra, further makes clear what is meant by this element of
judicial estoppel of successfully maintained positions are only those that were "actually
litigated" in the prior proceeding, not those that merely could have been litigated:
However, in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971), the
court clarified that the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral
estoppel and applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have been
determined.
This element of "successful maintenance" of an issue which was "actually litigated"
requires that the prior federal court not only have actually reviewed and relied on the
position, but the party asserting the position (Johnson) "prevailed" on that issue before the
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court.
There was no discernable action by the SBA or by Johnson, which was "maintained"
or pursued, let alone concluded "successfully" involving the "position," i.e. that there was
no Orvis-Johnson partnership. The requirement that a particular position be successfully
maintained forces the "position" through the filter of adjudication. Issues are necessarily
defined and the position is clarified, debated, and placed before a trier, and is either
maintained successfully or not. The Richards case leaves no room for deviation. It is not
enough under Richards that the alleged "position" Orvis strains to attribute to Johnson,
"might have been determined"or was merely asserted. It must have been "actually litigated."
The controverted "position" involving the interpretation of SBA quote, i.e. the prior
purportedly inconsistent statement, was not litigated. It was never successfully maintained.
This was duly and clearly argued below. The District Court and the Court of Appeals again
ignored an essential element of judicial estoppel.
vi. Johnson's purported prior statement to the SBA, if inconsistent, was the result of
inadvertence or mistake, not bad faith.
The final disputed issue of material fact is whether 's SBA answer was made in bad
faith, not a result of inadvertence or mistake. To claim that Johnson did not raise this as an
element simply ignores every pleading and argument and memorandum he has filed
throughout the litigation from his initial counterclaim to his counter-affidavit to the summary
judgment, forward.11 Mere inadvertence or mistake in making an inconsistent statement is
not sufficient to sustain judicial estoppel. There must be "bad faith" to invoke judicial
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estoppel as discussed, infra, as well as all other essential elements. The SBA answer was at
most a mistake and there is not any evidence of bad faith.
To isolate and review solely the bare text of the SBA question "Do you have any
interests in any partnerships" standing alone is per se taking the question out of the context
in which it arose. With inherent ambiguity in the question taken in the context it arose, the
answer itself is further additionally ambiguous. The presumption promoted by Orvis and
adopted by the District Court and Court of Appeals was that the "No" part of the answer was
made in bad faith to attempt to conceal this partnership business from the SBA so they would
not seize Johnson's interest with Orvis. This presumption defies the reality that the SBA
already knew about the Johnson-Orvis business dealings at length. It is an unreasonable
presumption. The answer Johnson believed he was giving about matters other than had been
discussed at length is not inconsistent with a claim or interest in the Johnson-Orvis
partnership.
If Johnson's answer, based upon his misunderstanding of the scope of the question,
was indeed "no interest in any partnership whatsoever including business dealings with Orvis
which we have already discussed at length," this clearly falls within the definition of
"mistake"as set forth in Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 40 P.3d 581 (Utah 2001):
Indeed, [a] mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous
mental condition, conception, or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehension,
or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission done or suffered by one or
both parties, without its erroneous character being intended or known at the time. 27 A
Am. Jur.2d Equity § 7 (1996). We acknowledged this principle over seventy years ago
in Provo Reservoir Co. v. Tanner, 68 Utah 21, 25-26, 249 P. 118, 119(1926),
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Judge Hanson's finding of "no mistake" while an improper weighing of evidence and
credibility, does not ipso facto meet the "bad faith"element for judicial estoppel required by
3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co.,supra, however, but even
assuming for purpose of argument that Judge Hanson's ruling does incorporate "bad faith,"
the most critical defect of Judge Hanson's presumption of "bad faith" in terms of this
summary judgment with opposing views established in the record, was the well-established
principle expressed in Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556 (Utah 2005):
'[A] finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective
intent.' Id. [Utah Depft of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1198 n. 6 (Utah
Ct.App.1991)] (citing Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah
1998)).
Still Standing also explicitly states that making a presumption of bad faith in the absence of
evidence is impermissible. No such factual determination was made, and given these parties'
positions, is one which will clearly be in dispute.
c. The doctrine of judicial estoppel may not be invoked to preclude
discovery of the truth and which would perpetuate a fraud and embezzlement.
The panel overlooked this fundamental bar to use of the doctrine of judicial estoppel
in the instant proceeding and that the doctrine is disfavored and narrowly applied. n Disregard
of this policy by the panel departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
or has sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Courts power of supervision. The purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to prevent
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perpetuation of falsehoods in the judicial system. The doctrine can never be used to block the
truth from ultimately prevailing. As stated in the very beginning in Tracy Loan & Trust Co.
v. Opens haw Inv., supra:
If a party litigant comes into court and falsifies, such conduct should not be employed
to prevent him from telling the truth in a later action where there has not been any
reliance on such false testimony, particularly where a rule estopping him from telling
the truth would operate to injure innocent persons and not merely punish the
wrongdoer.
See also Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.1990):
Judicial estoppel, however, should be applied with caution to avoid impinging on the
truth-seeking function of the court, because the doctrine precludes a contradictory
position without examining the truth of either statement.
The panel disregarded this public policy. The existence of the Orvis-Johnson
partnership is extensively demonstrated, for instance, by the nineteen exhibits attached to
Johnson's affidavit,13 and is the undisputed truth. Preventing an accounting of the proceeds
of that partnership embezzled by Orvis through deceit and misrepresentations sanctions a
fraud and promotes criminal behavior by giving it a judicial cloak based only upon an
Johnson's conditional and ambiguous response referencing "lots" to a different question to
a different party in a different context in a different proceeding on a different issue in a
different judicial system. This is not proper use of judicial estoppel.
d. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented,
and the District Court should be required to allow an accounting
of the partnership immediately.
The evidence of the Orvis-Johnson partnership is extremely well documented and has

l3

R 2284-2515
-45-

proceeded for many years. An extensive documentation of the partnership is set out in Mr.
Johnson's Summary Disposition Memorandum filed with the Court of Appeals. There are
hundreds of profit share checks and memos of accounting data provided by Orvis and
partnership documents. The Johnson's were receiving $35,000 per month at the time Orvis
and Mr. Lawrence bought the SBA judgment against them and commenced withholding
profit share. Orvis claimed in his initial Complaint in this action that all those profit share
funds were "gifts" from him to Johnson.14 That of course is wildly preposterous. However,
Orvis has not ever denied, since then, the validity of the documents of partnership that have
been presented. So while the existence of the partnership is virtually irrefutable, Orvis has
not bothered to even try to refute it. He has let pass any opportunities to deny the documents
and affidavits below or here. (Indeed inherent in Orvis' argument that Johnson "lied" to the
SBA about having an Orvis-Johnson partnership is the tacit admission to the obvious fact that
this would not be a "lie" as Orvis asserts, unless Johnson and Orvis do indeed have a
partnership. Orvis' strategy was to ignore the issues surrounding the existence of the
partnership, and to focus below and here, on the SBA quote defense. He should not be
allowed to deny the existence of the partnership because he has not done so before this. Thus,
the Orvis-Johnson partnership is a matter of established fact—though the actual accounting
therefore remains to be done. If the SBA quote is regarded as inapplicable or as not barring
a claim of existence of the partnership by this Court, then Johnson should not further have
to prove the partnership below, but rather should proceed to get an accounting finalized for
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the Orvis-Johnson partnership.
IX. CONCLUSION.
The Appellant asks the Supreme Court to find as follows:
A party moving for summary judgment always has the "burden" of persuasion that
no genuine dispute of material facts exist and that the undisputed facts entitle the movant to
a judgment as a matter of law. An opponent of a motion for summary judgment has no
burden in the traditional sense but may oppose a summary judgment purely on the basis of
lack of entitlement under the elements required to support a claim under the law, or that there
are additional facts which deflect from a movant's entitlement to a judgment, or that there
do exist genuine disputes of material fact. An opponent only has a "burden" to demonstrate
that there exists a dispute of facts if the movant has set forth all material facts required to
support a claim which are claimed to be not in dispute but which actually are disputed.
However, even under the Court of Appeals' burden shifting analysis, no prima facie
case was made out by Orvis in the first instance. The Court of Appeals and Third Judicial
District Court erred in finding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is properly invoked here
to estop from asserting a partnership interest with Orvis. The disputed SBA quote is not a
basis to estop Johnson's partnership claims. Judicial Estoppel requires distinct elements, each
of which are indispensable and none of which have been demonstrated by Orvis. The
elements, with the applicable facts of this case, are:
1. Reliance: Orvis did not detrimentally rely on his alleged understanding of the SBA
quote, or materially change his position as to his partnership with Johnson upon learning of
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the SBA quote.
2. Same Parties: The parties to the SBA litigation are not the same as the parties to this
litigation. Even though Orvis claims to be a privy of the SBA, because he used partnership
monies to acquire the judgment, he would not be the actual owner of the judgment, the
partnership would own it. If he conspired with attorney Victor Lawrence to acquire the
judgment against Johnson, the judgment would be void in his hands for fraud and public
policy.
3. Same subject matter. The issues in the SBA case and in this instant case must be
the same. The only issues cognizable are those issues that have been litigated in the prior
case. In the SBA case, that would be a real estate foreclosure and a guarantee under an SBA
note. Those issues are not the same as here.
4. The prior position must be successfully maintained: Johnson's prior allegedly
inconsistent position must have been litigated and Johnson must have prevailed on that
position. The disputed quote, or Orvis' interpretation of it, was not ever a "position" that was
litigated and successfully maintained.
5. Bad faith by the non-moving party: The interpretation by Orvis and the lower
courts of the meaning and intent of the SBA quote by Johnson was strongly disputed by
Johnson who provided a reasonable alternative documented meaning to the SBA quote. The
district court improperly granted summary judgment on this disputed material factual issue.
The district court improperly adopted that perspective of the facts that was the least favorable
to Johnson. The trial Court asserted in its minute entry that there was "no mistake" as to this
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fact, which is not in itself bad faith. The facts as asserted by Johnson, when viewed as he
urges prevent summary judgment. The district court also improperly weighed the credibility
ofJohnson.
The Orvis-Johnson partnership is well established and, as in any partnership is entitled
to an accounting.
For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the District Court and Court of Appeals
should be set aside and the matter returned to the trial court to order and oversee an
accounting and winding up, if applicable, under Utah part|i££ship law
DATED this
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